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Abstract: Hermann Cohen’s understanding of pantheism is a major factor in his 
critique of Spinoza. This paper examines both Spinoza’s view of pantheism and 
Cohen’s claim that pantheism is mostly a Christian doctrine, essentially opposed 
to the Jewish tradition. Cohen states (for example) that Spinoza “grants pantheism 
priority over monotheism, in the spirit of Christ.” Assessing first Spinoza’s writings 
on pantheism and then rabbinic stances on pantheism, I demonstrate that Cohen’s 
claim that Judaism is opposed to pantheism receives little, if any, confirmation from 
historical reality and conclude that his analysis of Spinoza’s pantheism has more to 
do with his negative feelings about the philosopher than with Spinoza’s philosophy.
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“This great enemy who emerged from our midst”1
Introduction
Hermann Cohen’s “Spinoza über Staat und Religion, Judentum und Chris-
tentum” (Spinoza on State and Religion, Judaism and Christianity) first 
appeared in 1915 in the Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur. Two 
years before, in the winter of 1913, Cohen had taught a class and a seminar 
on Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) at the Hochschule für die 
Wissenschaft des Judentums. This was Cohen’s first semester at the Hoch-
schule after retiring from more than 30 years of teaching at the University 
of Marburg. Cohen’s fame at the time was at its zenith, and his move to the 
Hochschule was a cause for celebration and excitement.
According to the testimony of some students who attended the TTP 
seminar, Cohen left no place for any expression of dissent.2 The text of 
“Spinoza on State,” which was the product of this seminar, still bears the 
marks of this “didactic” attitude. It is bombastic and not well argued. Thus, 
in one moment of emotional crescendo in the text, Cohen writes:
1 Spinoza on State and Religion, Judaism and Christianity, trans. Robert S. Schine (Jeru-
salem: Shalem, 2014) 58; Hermann Cohen, Werke, ed. Helmut Holzhey and Hartwig 
Wiedebach (Hildsheim: Olms, 1977–) 16.371.
2 Spinoza on State, vii.
For author’s use only.
2 Yitzhak Y. Melamed JSQ 
When Spinoza, with merciless severity, makes his own nation the object of con-
tempt  – at the time that Rembrandt lived on the same street and immortalized 
the ideal type of the Jew – no voices rises in protest against this humanly incom-
prehensible betrayal.3
Such patriotic rhetoric is quite typical of Cohen’s “Spinoza on State,” as the 
work reads more like a series of rants against the devil incarnate in the figure 
of the traitor from Amsterdam (“the demonic spirit of Spinoza”4) than like 
a sustained and serious philosophical polemic. From time to time, one can 
observe hints of critical arguments, but hardly any are fleshed out. The text 
is also replete with rudimentary factual and interpretative errors. Thus, 
when Cohen argues that Spinoza traces his pantheism to Jewish sources,5 
he erroneously cites Spinoza’s reference in Ethics to “some of the Hebrews” 
(quidam Hebraeorum)6 who argued for the identity of Sekhel, Maskil and 
Muskal (the Intellect, the Intellecting Subject and the Intellected Object) – a 
Maimonidean doctrine that has nothing to do with pantheism7 –  while the 
text Cohen clearly had in mind was Spinoza’s claim in Letter 73 that the 
traditions of the “ancient Hebrews” (antiquis Hebraeis) agree with Spinoza’s 
claim that “all things are in God.”8
Similarly, and on the very same page, Cohen ascribes to Spinoza the 
claim that “the God of the Old Testament is only a body,”9 a claim which 
is nowhere to be found in Spinoza’s works and which can be inferred from 
Spinoza’s text only through a patent fallacy.
One last example. Consider the following passage:
[For Spinoza] divine law is grounded in our mind. Yet this does not mean that our 
mind bears responsibility for producing and obeying the law. Instead, it means that, 
3 Spinoza on State, 49; Werke, 16.360–1.
4 Spinoza on State, 51; Werke, 16.363.
5 Spinoza on State, 22; Werke, 16.320.
6 E2p7s. I  refer to passages in the Ethics using standard abbreviations: a(-xiom), 
c(-orollary), p(-roposition), s(-cholium) and app(-endix); d stands for “definition” 
when it appears immediately to the right of the part of the book, and to “demonstration” 
in all other cases. Hence, E2p7s is the scholium to proposition 7 of Part 2 of the Ethics. 
Unless otherwise marked, all references to Spinoza’s works are to Collected Works of 
Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985–2016). For the Latin text of Spinoza, I rely on Spinoza, Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt 
(4 vols.; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925) and cite this edition by volume/page/line; thus, 
III/23/12 stands for volume 3, page 23, line 12.
7 Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (2 vols.; Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1963) 1.163.
8 Spinoza, Opera, IV/307/9–10.
9 Spinoza on State, 22; Werke, 16.321.
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by definition, the human mind and God are identical, inasmuch as He exists in the 
human mind.10
Hardly any claim in this brief passage is correct. Yet what is most striking 
is Cohen’s derivation of the identity of God and the human mind from the 
claim that God exists in the human mind. If I exist in North America, this 
obviously does not imply that I am identical to North America. What rule of 
inference Cohen sought to employ in this argument, and how this impres-
sive inference of the identity of God and the human mind is supposed to 
square with Cohen’s view of Spinoza as a pantheist – i. e., as considering the 
physical nature to be divine – is beyond my grasp.
I would like to concentrate here on one crucial issue: Cohen’s critique of 
Spinoza’s pantheism.11 My discussion of pantheism is divided into two sec-
tions. In the first I examine Cohen’s understanding of Spinoza’s pantheism. 
In the second I briefly examine the historical validity of Cohen’s claim that 
pantheism is a Christian doctrine, diametrically opposed to Judaism.
1. What Is Pantheism?
In order to establish a common ground, I suggest a working definition of 
pantheism as the view that “whatever is, is in God.” I pick this definition 
not only because it captures (more or less) Spinoza’s view on the relation 
between God and the world of finite things,12 but also in order not to pre-
judge the precise manner in which finite things are in God. Some versions 
of pantheism would hold that finite things are parts of God. Let us call this 
view whole-part pantheism. Spinoza is not a whole-part pantheist, as he 
repeatedly stresses that God’s essence is indivisible.13 Spinoza considers 
parts to be prior to their whole, both in nature and in knowledge.14 In this, 
Spinoza follows a long and widespread philosophical tradition which can 
be traced back at least to Boethius.15 Since the very first proposition of Part 
10 Spinoza on State, 31; Werke, 16.334–5.
11 By doing this, I will have to pass silently over a couple of surprising agreements between 
the two figures, such as the (false) claim that all of the prophets of the Hebrew Bible 
taught the same universal and simple morality. See, for example, Spinoza, Theological-
Political Treatise (Opera, Ch. 13, III/168/8–17) and Spinoza on State, 45; Werke, 16.355.
12 See E1p15: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”
13 See E1p12 (“No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it follows 
that the substance can be divided”), E1p13 (“A substance which is absolutely infinite is 
indivisible”) and E1p15s.
14 See E1p12d.
15 See Boethius, De Divisione, ed. J. Magee (Leiden: Brill, 1998) 879c.
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One of his Ethics states that a substance (and thus, God) is prior to anything 
that is in it, it is clear that the substance cannot have parts. The whole-part 
relation plays an important role in Spinoza’s metaphysics, but this role is 
restricted to the realm that Spinoza calls Natura naturata (E1p29s), i. e., the 
realm of modes. Spinoza hardly ever refers to parts of God.16 Thus, instead 
of claiming that finite things are parts of God, Spinoza consistently asserts 
that finite things (as well as some infinite things) are modes of God. Call 
this view substance-mode pantheism.17
Pantheism is sometimes distinguished from panentheism. I am familiar 
with two clear manners of drawing this distinction. According to one, pan-
theism asserts a symmetric dependence between God and the world of 
finite things (a view sometimes expressed by the formula that “the world 
is in God, and God is in the world”), while panentheism asserts an asym-
metric dependence of the world on God.18
An alternative way to draw a distinction between pantheism and panen-
theism is to say that pantheism asserts an identity between God and nature – 
as the totality of bodies (and mental items) – while panentheism asserts that 
all bodies (and thoughts) are in God, yet do not exhaust God – i. e., there 
are some aspects or elements of God that are beyond physical (and mental) 
nature.19
If we consider Spinoza’s view in light of these two ways of distinguishing 
between pantheism and panentheism, it is clear that Spinoza is a panentheist 
16 The one exception is a passage in the First Dialogue of Spinoza’s early work, the Short 
Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, in which God, qua the immanent cause of 
creatures, is presented as the cause and the whole encompassing all creatures (Opera, 
I/30/30). In his later works, Spinoza avoids any talk about God as a whole, and as a 
result he reconceives the notion of immanent cause as unifying causation and inher-
ence (instead of causation and being a whole).
17 For further discussion of the distinction between Substance-Mode Pantheism and 
Whole-Part Pantheism, see Y. Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 47–49.
18 Thus, the midrashic formula, “God is the place of the world, but the world is not 
His place” (Bereshit Rabbah, 68/9), seems to be a nice illustration of panentheism 
according to the first way of drawing the distinction.
19 These two criteria can be found in Gershom Scholem’s discussion of pantheism in 
the Kabbalah (“Kabbalah,” Encyclopedia Judaica [Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007] 
11.648–9), and in various recent studies of this issue. See, for example, Christopher 
C. Emerick, “Pantheism and Panentheism,” Encyclopedia of Christian Civilization 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 1755–1761. A third common way to draw this dis-
tinction suggests that according to the panentheist, the world is merely part of God 
(or that God is larger than the world). I disregard this somewhat crude view, since it 
employs the terminology of parthood, while many philosophers deny that God has any 
parts at all.
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(rather than a pantheist), according to both distinctions. He asserts: “What-
ever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”20 If 
we add to this his definitions of Substance21 and God,22 according to which 
God is not dependent on anything else, we get the panentheist side of the 
first distinction – i. e., that everything is in God and depends upon God, but 
not the other way around.
In order to see why Spinoza is also a panentheist according to the second 
distinction, we need only consider two other of his core claims. In the def-
inition of God, he asserts that God has infinitely many attributes, yet at the 
beginning of Part Two of the Ethics, he claims that we have no causal (“we 
neither feel”) or cognitive (“nor perceive”) access to any of the attributes 
of God apart from extension and thought.23 The infinitely many unknown 
divine attributes (and their modes) are just as real as the attributes of 
extension and thought with which we are familiar. Yet, these infinitely 
many attributes transcend everything we know, or even can know (Spinoza 
provides a careful and precise explanation for our in-principle inability to 
have causal or cognitive access to these attributes in Letters 64 and 6624). 
Since what we know as “nature” – i. e., the world of bodies and minds – 
clearly does not exhaust Spinoza’s God, Spinoza’s views fall on the panen-
theist side also according to the second distinction. With these preliminary 
clarifications in hand, let us now turn to Cohen’s explication and evaluation 
of Spinoza’s pantheism.
Cohen frequently uses the term “pantheism” to refer to Spinoza’s views 
as a whole. Thus, on one occasion, Cohen refers to “the formalism of pan-
theism.”25 Spinoza’s Ethics is indeed written more geometrico  – that is, 
derived from a restricted set of definitions and axioms. I believe this is an 
essential and impressive feature of the book. Still, the employment of the 
geometrical style is completely orthogonal to the claim of pantheism – i. e., 
one could deny pantheism and adopt the geometrical style, and the other 
way around. There is nothing inconsistent in a pantheistic view which is 
20 E1p15.
21 E1d3: “By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i. e., 
that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must 
be formed.”
22 E1d6: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i. e., a substance consisting of 
an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.”
23 E2a5: “We neither feel nor perceive any singular things (Nagelate Schriften, the 1677 
Dutch translation of Spinoza’s works, adds “of niets van de genatuurde natuur” [or 
anything of natura naturata]), except bodies and modes of thinking.”
24 See Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 156–165.
25 Spinoza on State, 56; Werke, 16.368–369.
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not written more geometrico. Thus, a bit more care in formulating his claims 
should make Cohen address the specific view of Spinoza he is about to 
criticize, rather than use the hodge-podge label “pantheism.”
More central and thus more problematic is the clear dichotomy Cohen 
frequently draws between (Jewish) monotheism and pantheism.26 Prima 
facie, monotheism seems to be consistent with pantheism, since pantheism 
may well (and in Spinoza’s case clearly does27) assert the existence of one 
unique God.28 I am not saying that there cannot be an argument from the 
uniqueness of God to the denial of pantheism, but Cohen presents none. 
At the very end of “Spinoza on State,” Cohen expresses a minor reservation 
concerning the dichotomy between monotheism and pantheism: “[H]istory 
has taught us that pantheism in itself does not stand in contradiction to 
monotheism.”29 However, he did not revise the rest of the book in light of 
this, and thus, at least until the last page of the work, we are led to believe 
that pantheism is monotheism’s enemy.
Cohen’s inept formulations in discussing Spinoza’s pantheism are not 
restricted to “Spinoza on State.” Even in Religion of Reason he argues that, 
from the point of view of monotheism (presumably his own point of view), 
“pantheism is nothing but anthropomorphism” (Ihm ist der Pantheismus 
nicht andres als Anthropomorphismus).30 Why is pantheism anthropo-
morphic? Do we have any evidence that Spinoza thought that nature has 
human form? Cohen provides no explanation for his characterization of 
pantheism as anthropomorphic. Again, I am not saying that there cannot be 
an argument for charging some versions of pantheism – perhaps even one 
we would attribute to Spinoza – with anthropomorphism, but Cohen does 
not provide such an argument.
What is the reason for Cohen’s animosity toward pantheism? Apart from 
his deep hostility to Spinoza, the arch-pantheist of modern philosophy, it 
26 See, for example, Spinoza on State, 48; Werke, 16.360: “Spinoza grants the teaching of 
Christ priority over Jewish monotheism. He grants pantheism priority of monotheism, 
in the spirit of Christ.”
27 See E1p14c1: “From this it follows that God is unique [unicum].”
28 We can conceive a view according to which two or more gods occupy various parts of 
nature so that they are jointly present in the whole of physical nature, but this is rarely, 
if ever, the view we have in mind when talking of pantheism. For a helpful discussion of 
such a view, see Warren Zev Harvey, “Judah Halevi’s Interpretation of the Tetragram-
maton,” in A Word Fitly Spoken: Studies in Mediaeval Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and 
the Qur āʾn presented to Haggai Ben-Shammai, ed. M. M. Bar-Asher et al. (Jerusalem: 
Ben-Zvi Institute, 2008) 125.
29 Spinoza on State, 58; Werke, 16.371.
30 Religion of Reason, 45; Religion der Vernuft, 52.
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seems that what disturbed Cohen most about pantheism was its alleged 
rejection of the transcendence of God.31 Yet here, too, Cohen relies on a 
rather shallow reading of Spinoza’s work. Many popular textbooks in the 
history of philosophy stress the “immanent” nature of Spinoza’s philosophy. 
Yet, if one reads Spinoza’s text closely, one is not able to find the vocabulary 
of immanence in any context but one: immanens appears only as a qualifi-
cation of causa. An “immanent cause” is a cause whose effect inheres in the 
cause, and Spinoza proves that God is the immanent cause of all things.32 
This is Spinoza’s only use of the term.
Earlier I argued that Spinoza is a panentheist in both senses of the term. 
Recall the claim that God’s infinitely many attributes apart from extension 
and thought are neither causally accessible nor conceivable by us. These 
divine attributes and their modes constitute infinitely many transcendent 
realms within Deus sive Natura (God or Nature). Thus, next to his claim 
that all things are in God, Spinoza is also committed to the radical tran-
scendence of almost all of God’s attributes: we can neither know nor have 
any causal interaction with almost all of God’s attributes. A  philosopher 
of religion whose main concern is with the transcendence of God would 
be overwhelmed by the scope of transcendence in Spinoza. In fact, I sus-
pect that if we put aside Maimonides’ radical and bold variant of negative 
theology (that is, the view that God’s essence is incomprehensible and can 
only be described by what God is not), Spinoza’s system constitutes one of 
the more radical variants of transcendent theology.
31 Even if we grant Cohen the claim that Spinoza rejects the transcendence of God, it 
is not at all clear what precisely is wrong with rejecting the transcendence of God. 
The closest Cohen comes to presenting the beginning of a possible argument to that 
effect is his claim that pantheism “does not bide well with prophetic messianism” 
(Spinoza on State, 56; Werke, 16.368). Why precisely pantheism is inconsistent with 
“prophetic messianism” seems to me a mystery. Cohen must have been aware of the 
combination of pantheism and messianism in the writings of numerous Kabbalists. 
Benjamin Pollock helpfully suggested to me that Cohen was attempting to criticize 
Spinoza from within his own Neo-Kantian philosophical framework, which requires 
God’s transcendence as the ground of morality. This may well be the case, but genuine 
philosophical polemics must begin with premises acceptable by both sides (otherwise, 
the argument is a mere restatement of one’s own position). If Cohen had an argument 
to the effect that morality requires the transcendence of God, he should have stated it, 
and then we could weigh its value. In the absence of such an argument, we are left with 
his angry, patriotic rant; qua philosophy, this is not particularly impressive.
32 See E1p18d. Cf. Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 61–66.
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2. Rabbinic Pantheism
Let us now examine Cohen’s claims that pantheism is mostly a Chris-
tian doctrine and that it is essentially opposed to the Jewish tradition. He 
presents these claims in several places in “Spinoza on State.” Thus, for exam-
ple, he argues: “Spinoza grants the teaching of Christ priority over Jewish 
monotheism. He grants pantheism priority over monotheism, in the spirit 
of Christ.”33 In another work, he slightly moderates this claim and admits 
the presence of pantheism within Jewish thought:
True, Jewish philosophers, from the earliest times, have not always been impervious 
to the lures of pantheism; however, there were other Jewish thinkers who would 
remonstrate with them for posing a threat to monotheism.34
Cohen does not tell the reader who were “the Jewish thinkers who would 
remonstrate” with the advocates of pantheism, and for a good reason. If we 
look at the six centuries between 1200 and 1800, we can hardly find more 
than three or four rabbinic critiques of pantheism. Most of these critiques 
were unknown to Cohen, and in all of these cases the anti-pantheist attacks 
ended in failure.35
Rabbi Moshe Taku, an early 13th-century resident of Regensburg (Ger-
many), was a respectable rabbinic figure and a member of the circles of 
the authors of the canonical Tosafot commentary on the Talmud. In Ketav 
Tamim (Wholesome Writ, a fascinating manuscript that has not yet been 
printed), Taku charges with heresy no less than five towering rabbinic 
authors, due to expressions in their writings that could be interpreted as 
identifying God with the universe: Saadia Gaon, Shlomo Ibn Gabirol, Avra-
ham Ibn Ezra, Moses Maimonides and (Taku’s contemporary) Yehuda the 
33 Spinoza on State, 48; Werke, 16.360. Cf. Werke, 16.319: “Spinoza’s pantheism dis-
poses him favorably toward the divinity of Christ, and his predisposition renders the 
divinity of Christ comprehensible.” Obviously, pantheism “disposes one favorably” 
toward the divinity of every particular – Balaam’s donkey and my porcupine included. 
However, Spinoza has little sympathy for the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, 
describing it as similar to the view “that a circle has assumed the nature of a square” 
(Opera, IV/309/6). On Spinoza’s sardonic reading of the core myths of Christianity, see 
Y. Melamed, “Christus secundum spiritum: Spinoza, Jesus, and the Infinite Intellect,” in 
The Jewish Jesus, ed. Neta Stahl (New York: Routledge, 2012) 140–151.
34 Reason and Hope: Selection from the Jewish Writings of Hermann Cohen, trans. Eva 
Jospe (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1993) 152.
35 The following discussion relies on research conducted jointly with Jonathan Garb 
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem).
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Pious.36 To the best of my knowledge, this was the first and most extensive 
attack on pantheism within the rabbinic world. Yet it seems to have had 
little, if any, impact.
In medieval and early modern Kabbalah, pantheism and panentheism 
are commonplace. Numerous Kabbalists endorsed the formula “God is 
Nature” and issued unmistakable endorsements of pantheism or panen-
theism. Thus, the Zohar states: “He surrounds all the worlds, and nothing 
surrounds Him … There is nothing outside Him; He fills all the worlds, 
and nothing else fills Him.”37 Similarly, the 16th-century Safed Kabbalist, 
R. Moshe Cordovero, claims: “All is one and there is nothing separate from 
him … all is included in Him and adheres to Him.”38
A small-scale Pantheismusstreit occurred in the early 18th century, when 
David Nieto, the newly appointed Haham of the Spanish and Portuguese 
Synagogue in London, gave a sermon in which he claimed that God and 
Nature are one and the same39. Shortly thereafter, a group of community 
members accused Nieto of Spinozism. To defend and explain his views, 
Nieto published a Spanish theological treatise, De La Divina Providencia 
O Sea Naturaleza Universal, O Natura Naturante. In this treatise, he did 
not retreat from his claim, but rather argued that the very same view also 
appears in various midrashic and kabbalistic texts. The dispute was brought 
before R. Tzvi Hirsch Ashkenazi (the Hakham Tzvi), who resided at the 
time in Altona, next to Hamburg, and was considered as one of the leading 
rabbinic authorities of his generation. After weighing the views of both 
parties, the Hahham Tzvi ruled in favor of Nieto, arguing that Nieto’s claim 
was legitimate and most pious.40
Toward the end of the 18th century, R. Elijah of Vilnius argued in a mar-
ginal note of a public letter that Hassidic pantheism amounted to an idola-
trous worship “of every tree and every stone.”41 To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the only case in the rabbinic context where pantheism was charged as 
leading to or as constituting idolatry (though the charge was widespread in 
36 Moshe of Taku, Ktav Tamim, Ms. H711, Paris facsimile ed. Joseph Dan, Jerusalem: 
Dinur Center, 1984) 17a–b, 27a–28b, and 52a.
37 Zohar, Pinhas, 3.449.
38 Cordovero, Shi uʾr Qoma, 32.
39 On the Nieto affair, see Jakob J. Petuchowski, The Theology of Haham David Nieto: An 
Eighteenth-Century Defense of the Jewish Tradition (New York: Ktav, 1970) 118–122, 
and Melamed, “He Is the Place of the World.”
40 Ashkenazi, Shut Hakham Tzvi, Qu. 18, p. 14b.
41 Mordecai Wilensky, Hassidim and Their Opponents: A Study of the Controversy between 
Them in the Years 1772–1815 (Hebrew; Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1970) 188.
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medieval Christianity42). The charge was rescinded by R. Elijah’s eminent 
disciple, R. Hayim of Volozhin, who would himself write that one should 
annul himself in God, since “God fills All of this world and all of the worlds, 
and there is no place devoid of Him.”43
Conclusion
Thus, Cohen’s claim that Judaism is essentially opposed to pantheism 
receives little, if any, confirmation from historical reality. And his analysis 
of Spinoza’s pantheism tells us a great deal more about Cohen’s mood when 
he was writing “Spinoza on State” than of anything else. There is a famous 
midrashic dictum that both extreme love and extreme hatred may make 
a person behave in a manner inconsistent with his or her typical behav-
ior.44 I would like to believe that Cohen’s discussion of Spinoza might be an 
exemplification of this rabbinic observation – that the shortcomings of his 
discussion are not characteristic of his thinking as a whole.
42 See, for example, Aquinas’ attack on those who conceived of God as “being in general 
which can be predicated of everything [ens commune praedicabile de omnibus]” 
(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4).
43 Hayim Itzkovich, Nefesh haTzimtzum: Rabbi Chaim Volozihn’s Nefesh haChaim, ed. 
and trans. Avinoam Fraenkel (2 vols.; Jerusalem and New York: Urim, 2015) 580.
44 See Bereshit Rabbah, Vayera, 55/8.
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